The starting position of liberalism – and at the same time a final perspective – is a hypothetical situation in which relatively independent units cooperate through a system of contracts. When adapting this formula to reality, it was of course necessary to accept compromises and concessions, so by introducing additional elements for the sake of realism, the system was always losing its original simplicity. But the democratisation was something more than a compromise or a concession. It turned liberalism into a doctrine in which the primary agents were no longer individuals, but groups and institutions of the democratic state. Instead of the individuals striving for the enrichment of the social capital with new ideas and aspirations, there emerged individuals voicing their demands called rights and acted within the scope of the organised groups. Those groups were subsequently petitioning the state institutions, and exerted pressure on them to change legislation and political practices. Over time, these groups began to affect judicial decisions of the courts, demanding legal acceptance of their position and acquired privileges. In the final outcome the state in liberal democracy ceased to be an institution pursuing the common good, but became a hostage of groups which treated it solely as an instrument of change securing their interests.

The state, more and more involved in the process of supporting the group aspirations, largely lost its general republican character and turned into a conglomerate of the social, economic, cultural and other policy programmes, enacted and imposed through democratic procedures. This in turn meant that the state had to take over more and more specific responsibilities, far beyond the normal operations of the state apparatus. As the new expectations of the new groups had more and more to do with their status and social recognition, the traditional means of the state policy were no longer sufficient. It became necessary to intervene deeply into the social substance – it was there that the roots of status and recognition resided – either through a direct political action or indirectly by changing the laws and making appropriate judicial decisions, making drastic adjustments in morality and social mores to guarantee equality. The state representatives armed with the rhetoric of antidiscrimination felt it was their duty to regulate the matters that for too long remained unregulated, which often meant giving privileges to certain groups and taking them away from other groups.

Once the liberal democracy became established, those who in the past complained about the growth of the communist state and compared it with the glorious example of the asceticism of a liberal state could not invoke such contrast any longer. The liberal-democratic state – still more effective than a communist state – slowly and steadily underwent a similar expansion and likewise deeply intruded in the lives of its citizens. However, while in the case of the communist state its spread and its intrusive interference had their source in the determination of the authorities who, in order to survive, had to impose, forcefully, more and more controls of social spontaneity, in a liberal-democratic state the source of this growing intrusion are the citizens themselves, both as individuals and as members of the privilege-seeking groups.

With the democratisation of liberalism, the state unleashed a drive for hyperactivity of those groups, which in turn resulted in the hyperactivity of political and legal institutions. The government, the courts and the legislative bodies have been under a constant pressure to continue their policy of distributing further privileges and to grant further rights; the politicians soon discovered that giving way to this pressure or even pre-empting it was to their advantage since the continuation of the policy of equality was the best method to acquire electoral votes, to secure democratic legitimacy, and thus to stay in power. Thus a peculiar race began: on the one hand, the groups were inventing more and more effective means to influence the policies of the executive, the legislative and the judiciary, and on the other, the politicians, the lawmakers and the judges were more and more involved in a competition as to who will be the best provider of the new privileges and rights to those groups.

A growing number of group claims required new legislative and judicial decisions, new rules of all sorts to improve the existing law and to provide it with new and ever more up-to-date interpretations. The legislatures and the courts struggled tirelessly with the new political reality and often assumed the initiative themselves in order to strengthen and legitimise their political role. Reversing this process was impossible. The withdrawal of the state from some areas would entail reducing the activity of the government ministers, local officials, parliamentarians, provincial and regional governors and others. And such a thing could not and is not to be permitted because in democratic politics it is in nobody’s interest; the democratic mechanism itself was created not to limit political activity but to keep it going at an ever higher speed. Restless acting and reacting, amending and modifying, initiating and taking over, responding to new challenges and challenging others, all these have been perceived by the politicians, the society and the media as the proper conduct according to which the men of politics have been evaluated.

Naturally, it is sometimes difficult to see the relationship between the interests of a particular group and the activities of the state due to a habit of constant flurry of activity of the politicians and political institutions. The state which does not stay in a constant flurry of activity or which does not effectively convince its citizens that it will vigorously hustle and bustle to ensure better conditions for specific groups, quickly passes into the hands of new parties or new trustees of political power. The slogan “to change and reform” is repeated during every election, regardless of the economic and political situation. Oftentimes, the changes are superficial and unnecessary; they complicate simple things, replace the better with worse, or the lesser evil with more evil, but everyone feels the urge to act, even if the activity is phoney. Hence the well-known phenomenon of uncontrolled growth of regulations about which we all complain but whose slowing down we find intolerable.

It is also typical of our time that the growth of the state does not go along with belief – as exhibited in the past – in the miraculous power of the state. The state ceased to be associated with great hopes and is no longer viewed as a political object of worship. Rather, it appears that with its growing influence and progressive taking on new responsibilities, the state loses the respect of citizens. Demands directed at the state are nowadays expressed in a tone of exasperation and angry impatience rather than with the belief in its charitable omnipotence. It can be considered a paradox that a liberal-democratic man expects more and more from the state which he values less and less.

Today, it is the major political forces in Europe that mainly contribute to the growth of the state. The slogans to limit the state are of course proclaimed by all, but they continue to be declarations only; their implementation would constitute a suicide for politicians and would provoke the anger of citizens. Such attempts would be perceived as the loss of power gained by groups and the withdrawal of support of the state. This in turn would have to be considered as a threat to the triumphs of liberal democracy.

Let us ignore the issue to what extent the inner logic of the theories of liberalism and democracy led to the coalescing of liberal and democratic institutions that we observe today. This is a separate subject, to be discussed at another occasion. But the fact is that due to various historical circumstances we live today in a homogeneous system, which seems final and has managed to delegitimise all alternatives.

This impression of finality is due to several reasons, out of which the important ones have already been mentioned. In Europe the impression has an additional aspect which stems from the impact of the European Union, which has managed to re-create the liberal-democratic model at the supranational level, and in some measure – so to say – crowning the whole structure with it. The current EU doctrine explicitly states that it is the ultimate system, a culminating emanation of the “European values”, a final stage of the history of the European peoples, worthy of absolute protection and praise. This doctrine has a practical side to it, which is an ever growing system of controls, regulations, legislation and jurisdiction. The countries that break loose of the process or the politicians who express reservations – no matter how timidly – are immediately subject to disproportionately harsh criticism. The EU propaganda has it that the ongoing political debate in Europe for two and a half thousand years came to an end and that the Europeans have finally resolved all major political problems not only on an intellectual level or at the level of the institutions across the continent, but in a way all over the world, as the EU has become the highest arbiter of gauging all political developments in the world and has become – as the Soviet Union once did – the hope of the oppressed peoples of all continents.

The EU – not surprisingly – has become a major regulating power in Europe, and the EU politicians proudly state that they are responsible for seventy per cent of the national legislation. This legislation is mostly unnecessary in view of the majority of the citizens but necessary from the perspective of the European institutions: it confirms their power, regardless of whether they are beneficial for the people or not. The process of legislation involves vast numbers of people, organisations and committees in the process of participation and thus creates a colossal army preparing the ground for subsequent legislation and neutralising – so far very effectively – any critics. All this is submerged in a sea of propaganda and ideology. Every piece of legislative regulation is presented not as a simple organisational or administrative decision but as a step toward something great, for which we, the Europeans, should be grateful. Every directive, Council document, resolution or report of the European Parliament must be accompanied by the boastful rhetoric proclaiming it to be another irresistible proof of the coming victory of the European project. Even what seems to be an obvious failure is presented as a resounding success. The year 2011, in which the euro system collapsed was, in the words of the President of Europe (that is, the President of the Council), the annus horribilis, which, he added, in the future will be considered the annus mirabilis. The communist politicians resorted to the same device: they also categorically brushed away any suggestion that the system had an inherent weakness, and were busy convincing the citizens that a constant struggle with the permanent crisis only confirmed the system’s superiority.