First, a bit of background on my philosophy:

Your philosophy sounds like a thought experiment, not a philosophy.

if a person can accurately predict the future

I can accurately predict the future: the sun will rise tomorrow. I can inaccurately predict the future: the earth will stop in its tracks at 4am PST. More, I can find a spectrum everywhere from accurate to inaccurate: if the sun stops in its tracks at 4am PST, it will have risen for three time zones in the United States and several more across Europe, Africa and Asia.

then they can choose to betray that future and have potential for free will.

As demonstrated, I don't have a hope in hell about "choosing" anything above. It'll happen or it won't entirely without my ability to impact it. But let's choose another condition to illustrate the fallacy further:

I predict I will get out on my own side of the bed tomorrow, instead of crawling over my wife. Now - if I choose to crawl over my wife, does that demonstrate free will? What if instead I predict that I will crawl over my wife? If I do it, do I lack free will? If I instead get up on my own side of the bed, does that demonstrate free will through defiance?

...See, I think it merely demonstrates indecision. Your lady Susie isn't "predicting" anything - she's letting you wrap her velocipedal choices in a metaphysical dilemma.

Sometimes a pipe is just a pipe.