See, I'm not sure that distinction matters. It's like this: - the device shipped with mediocre encryption, protected by tamper-proofing - stronger encryption is currently available - the FBI wants an end-run around the tamper-proofing So whether the FBI wants to cripple "encryption" or "security" is a legal point, to be sure, but the precedent set is all about the after-the-fact part. They want to be able to compel a company to crack open something that was secure. That makes everything that is secure potentially insecure whenever the government can shove a writ through. You're right - strong encryption will protect you. But there's also the pain-in-the-ass factor: if most people are using weak encryption, then using weak encryption is a great way to blend into the crowd. If everyone uses strong encryption, then using strong encryption becomes anonymous. In the NSA/FBI/CIA/TLA's horror world, everyone shifts to strong encryption, meaning that they can't single people out just by what encryption they're using. And then, they're sure going to want to be able to compel Apple into cracking that strong encryption, rather than just weak encryption. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Export_of_cryptography_from_the_United_StatesTechnically they aren't crippling encryption after the fact, it was poorly designed from the beginning and they instead relied on tamper-proofing the device itself to protect the data on the phone.
I'm actually unaware of this, could you talk about which laws you are referring to? I know of no strong encryption laws on the books, as basically every project that calls SSL (basically everything) is using strong cryptography.