Help me out, I still don't get it. Isn't "freeloading" a systemic feature of the labor market itself—i.e., it would be present regardless of whether right-to-work laws existed or not? If there's a market where employers have offered to pay X to a certain group of workers, presumably the employers are willing to pay X and below for labor. Unsigned workers are looking to maximize their pay. Doesn't microeconomic theory dictate that the unsigned workers and the employers will settle on X as wage? In other words, if you are an unsigned worker and you see others getting paid X, rationally you won't sell your labor for less than X. (And if the unsigned worker is willing to undercut and work for less than X, so be it—it doesn't sound like right-to-work forbids undercutting this way.) I guess my question is: wouldn't market forces (ECON 101 dynamics) prevail in allowing non-union members to benefit from union bargaining, even without right-to-work law? I'm sorry if this question betrays a sore lack of understanding; I'm just trying to get a better handle on how the labor market works.
I can see how right-to-work laws undermine that gravitational "pull". But do you reject the possibility of legitimate reasons for wanting to benefit from union wages but not be part of the union itself? Political reasons, for example: unions may make campaign contributions to candidates the worker does not support, or they may hold positions that worker finds abominable (personally, the anti-immigrant stance and rhetoric of some prominent unions makes me sick). I can see why freeloading is unfair; but it seems equally unfair for a worker to be denied a more liveable wage for political reasons.
'freeloading' is unavoidable in the context of the wider market but there is no reason to prevent employers from signing exclusivity contracts and it's absurd to force unions to provide real services to people that explicitly choose to not support or participate in the union.