And we're back! These cases continue to be fairly uncontroversial, as the bigges almost always end up being announced at the end of the term (so this summer). I've got a nice backlog to get through in the meantime, though, so let's get caught up!

Shaw v. United States (December 12, 2016). Justice Breyer writes for a unanimous court. Full opinion.

This outcome seems decidedly uncontroversial.

Federal law makes it a crime to "knowingly...defraud a financial institution." 18 U.S.C. §1344(1). The institutions covered include a federally-insured bank, in this case Bank of America. 18 U.S.C. §20.

Defendant Shaw obtained the bank account numbers and other identifying information belonging to a one Stanley Hsu. Shaw then used this information to take money out of Hsu's account and put it into accounts owned by Shaw. He was subsequently convicted of violating the statute I quoted above. On appeal, Shaw argued that the statute doesn't apply where he intended to defraud a person, not the bank. The Supreme Court needless to say didn't buy it. Shaw's main argument was, oddly, to say that the statute was intended to protect the bank's property rights in whatever money was taken. The Court noted that usually the bank can use your money to e.g. provide a loan to someone else, they just have to give it back to you when you ask. Even where the customer retains full ownership of any deposits, the bank becomes a bailee, which in U.S. law refers to someone who takes temporary possession of property on behalf of the owner (the classic example is a garage where you pay to park your car). Even under that framework, Shaw's argument fails, because a bailee has "the right to possess the deposited funds against all the world but the bailor," i.e. the bank customer.

Interestingly, Shaw had actually won at the lower court, which was the Ninth Circuit. This is likely the only reason the Supreme Court granted certiorari to begin with, i.e. to correct what they saw as a clear misinterpretation of the statute.

White v. Pauly (January 10, 2017). Per curiam. Full opinion.

This reads like something a law professor would make up in order to haze his or her students.

Two police officers (neither of whom are involved in this appeal) went to a house where Pauly lived after a couple of motorists said they had witnessed Pauly driving drunk. Viewing the facts in the light most favorable to Pauly, it appears that they did not identify themselves as police officers clearly if at all, but did say they were going to come into the house if Pauly and his roommate did not come out. Pauly and his roommate, believing the officers were home invaders, then told the officers that they had guns (and would later shoot at them). White, a third officer, arrived a few minutes after all of this kicked off. Hearing some of what happened and seeing Pauly shoot in the direction of the other two officers (one of whom shot back but missed), White shot and killed Pauly.

The question before the Supreme Court is whether the case should've been dismissed based on White's qualified immunity as a police officer. Qualified immunity in this case allows an officer to avoid liability for violating someone's rights where the violation was not against "clearly established law." The right in question here is the Fourth Amendment prohibition on excessive force, which also involves an officer's duty to identify himself as such prior to using force. The Supreme Court didn't talk about the merits of the case, but only said that White had not violated "clearly established law" given the facts as considered by the lower court.

Lightfoot v. Cendant Mortgage Corp. (January 18, 2017). Justice Sotomayor writes for a unanimous court Full opinion.

This one is a fairly prosaic issue of court jurisdiction and procedure. Federal law gives Fannie Mae the ability to sue or be sued in any State or Federal court that otherwise has jurisdiction over a given case. The petitioners in this case had sued Fannie Mae in state court regarding their mortgage. Fannie Mae then had the case removed to federal court (a process where a case can be transferred from state to federal court on the motion of the defendant). Removal is only allowed where the federal court could have heard the case anyway. Fannie Mae (and the lower courts) concluded that the federal statute gave federal courts jurisdiction per se when a case involved Fannie Mae. SCOTUS disagreed, saying that the statute is not that specific, and "any court of competent jurisdiction" (the law's wording) means just that.

Buck v. Davis (February 22, 2017). Chief Justice Roberts writes the majority, joined by Justices Kennedy, Ginsburg, Breyer, Sotomayor, and Kagan. Justices Thomas and Alito dissent. Full opinion.

Petitioner Buck was found guilty of capital murder by a state court in Texas. At the sentencing phase, and before imposing the death penalty, a jury must unanimously decide that the defendant is likely to be a danger to others in the future. As part of the sentencing process, Buck was evaluated by a psychologist, Dr. Walter Quijano. In his written report, Dr. Quijano stated that the fact that Buck is black was a factor that made him more likely to commit future crimes (although he ultimately concluded that Buck was not himself likely to be a future danger to society). At the sentencing hearing, Buck's attorney called Dr. Quijano to the stand, and got testimony including this racial factor (including the fact that race was "know[n] to predict future dangerousness").

While Buck's subsequent appeals were pending, another defendant in whose trial Dr. Quijano had given similar testimony had appealed to the Supreme Court. Once the Court agreed to hear the case, Texas's Attorney General determined that there were six cases, including Buck's, where similar testimony had been given by Dr. Quijano. In the other five, Texas conceded error and agreed to new sentencing hearings.

In Buck's case, however, the state did not concede. By this point, Buck had raised the issue of ineffective assistance of counsel, but the courts determined that since he had not raised that issue on his initial appeal, he could not do so now. Once he exhausted his first round of appeals, Buck asked for federal habeas corpus relief, whereby someone asks the federal courts to review a state criminal conviction for violation of federal rights. Buck lost at the district and circuit level, and appealed to SCOUTS, which reversed the lower decisions. Again, generally someone can't raise an issue late in the game if they hadn't raised it at the lower level. There's an exception for extreme situations, however, and the Court concluded that there was a good chance that Buck's race played a role in his being sentenced to death. That in turn meets those "extraordinary circumstances" required. Moreover, Buck's case clearly showed ineffective assistance of counsel, since Buck's lawyer himself put Dr. Quijano on the stand and elicited the testimony about Buck's race making him more likely to commit future crime.

Life Technologies Corp. v. Promega Corp. (February 22, 2017). Justice Sotomayor writes for the majority, joined by Justices Kennedy, Ginsburg, Breyer, and Kagan. Justices Alito and Thomas joined to all but one part of the opinion (and concur in the result). Chief Justice Roberts did not take part in the case. Full opinion.

Petitioner Life Technologies licensed some patented genetic testing technology from Promega. The testing kits had five components. Life Technologies made one in the U.S., then shipped them to the UK for combination with the other four components (all made in the UK). Life Technologies subsequently violated the terms of its license, and Promega sued, arguing that Life Technologies had violated a statute that prohibits anyone from supplying "all or a substantial portion of the components" of a patented thing for combination abroad. The question ultimately hinges on whether one component out of five is "a substantial portion," and SCOUTS says that it's not.

Fry v. Napoleon Community Schools (February 22, 2017). Justce Kagan writes for the majority, joined by the Chief Justice and Justices Kennedy, Ginsburg, Breyer, and Sotomayor. Justice Alito (joined by Justice Thomas) filed a separate opinion concurring in the result. Full opinion.

This is another fairly narrow procedural question. The Frys's daughter (the parents are suing on behalf of their child) has cerebral palsy, and uses a service dog. Initially, her school refused to allow the dog in the classroom. The Frys filed a complaint with the Department of Education, arguing that the school had violated the Americans With Disabilities Act, and also began homeschooling her. The Department of Education ultimately agreed with the Frys, and the school in turn agreed to allow the service dog. By this point, however, the Frys apparently didn't trust the school officials, and so enrolled their daughter in a different school. They then sued the original school system.

The only question to be answered is whether the Frys were required to exhaust all their administrative remedies (i.e. go through the Department of Education's procedures) before suing. SCOTUS says that this question in turn depends on whether "the gravamen of the plaintiff's suit" is the denial of a "free appropriate public education" under federal law. Since this wasn't addressed by the lower courts, SCOTUS sent the case back for them to decide this.