- In this paper I propose a novel view on the persistence of identity through time. I propose that an object is defined by a certain set of basic properties, that these properties are maintained throughout the life span of the whole, and that the whole does not cease to exist due to the replacement of individual parts. Given the constant change throughout the persistence of a single whole, I call this idea of identity “Fluid Identity.”
Fascinating stuff. Don't remember where I originally found this; maybe the philosophy subreddit? All I know for sure is that it's one of the first philosophy papers I ever read, and it remains the basis for most of my thoughts and beliefs on identity. Give it a read, if you're inclined.
As are mine, instinctively... but I'm not sure why -- one reason I've always loved this thought experiment. His argument for temporal continuity is good but may not hold up across the board. For example, Here he tosses sentience of sorts into the ring and he begins to lose me. However, I'm a huge fan of the application of common sense to philosophy and ethics, so I'm sympathetic. Great post. Thoughtful web.From this point on I will be using the example of the ship of Theseus to explain the idea of fluid identity and relate it to organisms and people. The ship of Theseus example consists of a sailing ship, which gathers wood floating in the water, replacing itself piece by piece, until eventually it contains none of its original parts. There is also another ship behind it, which gathers the replaced parts as they are discarded from the ship of Theseus. Eventually that ship is composed entirely of the parts that originally constituted the ship of Theseus. The common questions that are raised are whether or not the ship at the end is the same as the ship at the beginning, and if at the end of the process, has the trailing ship become the ship of Theseus? My answers to these questions are yes and no respectively.
In his paper, Lewis supposes that Methuselah is a being who lives 969 years, but is plagued with a poor memory. As a result, he can only remember 137 years into the past. As a result, segments of Methuselah’s life are related if and only if they are 137 years apart. This means that only the 137 year segments are constituent persons. But this is where I disagree. It seems counter-intuitive to say that just because there is no memory of a stage of life does not mean that it is not part of the same person. As children, we remember little to nothing before a very early age. Are we ready to say that we have absolutely no relation to the infant/childhood versions of ourselves? Rather, I propose that we are always have some relation to all of our temporal parts, but it decreases as time goes on. You are not so different from the person you were a few moments before reading this paper, yet you are a vastly different person from the one you were in fifth grade. The reason that this is true is that change in identity is not an all or nothing question. A person experiences changes slowly throughout their lifetime.