Well, my last installment was quite well received (thanks to mk for my first ever badge), so I thought I'd do a little catching up from the just-finished term. This day saw a total of five decisions handed down, although two were ties meaning the lower court's ruling stands. On with the show!
United States v. Texas
This is probably the most-anticipated case to be decided, but also the most anticlimactic. There's a decent amount of background for this one, so please bear with me. Back in 2012, President Obama issued an executive order that affected immigration status for certain people in the United States illegally. The two programs are known as Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA) and Deferred Action for Parents of Americans and Lawful Permanent Residents (DAPA). These programs provided employment authorization and a kind of quasi-legal status to hundreds of thousands of immigrants. Several states (including Texas) sued, arguing that the executive order was illegal. Specifically, they said that it violated two provisions of the Administrative Procedures Act (APA). The states argued that the federal government was required to submit its rule change to the public for a comment period, as required by the APA. Secondly, they said that the government's action was beyond the executive branch's authority (also under the APA). Basically, Congress has ultimate authority over immigration, but can delegate that authority to the executive branch within certain constraints. The states' argument was that Congress hadn't given the executive the authority to do what it did; they could have if they wanted to, but the fact that they didn't do so explicity shows that Congress specifically intended to deny this authority.
So, the states filed suit in a federal district court in Texas. They also requested an injunction pending trial, which is when a court says "you can't do x." In order to get an injunction, the states have to show that they're likely to win at trial. They did so to the district court's satisfaction, so the court issued an injunction telling the executive branch that it could not act on the new immigration rules. The federal government appealed to the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals, who examined the case and agreed with the lower court. After discussing some procedural issues (such as whether the states had standing to begin with), the Fifth Circuit first concluded (PDF) that these immigration rules were substantive enough to require a notice-and-comment period under the APA, which the government hadn't done. In addition, the rules touch on something under Congress' authority, not the president's, and there was no indication that Congress had given the president the authority to do what he did:
(Internal citations omitted). The Court went on to say that even if this were not the case, the executive action would still be void as "expressly contrary" to the Immigration and Naturalization Act, the overarching federal framework for immigration.
So, why all this talk about the Fifth Circuit's ruling? Well, as you know, the Supreme Court is currently short one member, having only eight justices right now. When it came for the Supreme Court to decide the case, no majority emerged, with a 4-4 vote as to whether to agree with the Fifth Circuit or not, to some degree or another. I say this last because we don't actually know what the opposing sides were; the Court doesn't give an opinion when there's a tie, just a quick statement saying "The judgment is affirmed by an equally divided Court."
What this means is that the Fifth Circuit's ruling stands, and the law is unenforceable. Interestingly, because the injunction is against the federal government itself, it doesn't matter that the Texas trial court only has jurisdiction over things happening in Texas. It probably means the government could end up in contempt if it follows the law anywhere, although no one seems to be 100% sure about that. But from what commentary I have seen, the prevailing belief is that the government isn't going to risk some kind of constitutional showdown over this.
Opinion (PDF), such as it is. But really the Fifth Circuit's opinion (PDF also) is the controlling one. There are some interesting standing issues discussed too, which I didn't get into in my summary.
Dollar General Corp. v. Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians
This one is actually a pretty interesting if narrow issue.
In the spring of 2003, a manager at a Dollar General store on a Choctaw Indian reservation allegedly molested a 13-year-old boy, who was a member of the Choctaw tribe. The boy filed a civil suit against both the manager and Dollar General. The defendants (i.e. Dollar General and the manager) argued that the tribal court didn't have jurisdiction over them, since they were not tribal members. However, the Supreme Court had previously ruled (back in the '80s) that while that is generally true, there is an exception where an individual (or corporation) voluntarily puts itself in contact with the tribe, and the court case is related to that connection. In other words, if Dollar General voluntarily put itself in contact with the tribe, and the boy's suit is related to that contact, then the tribal courts have jurisdiction. The Fifth Circuit found (PDF) that sufficient contacts between the tribe and Dollar General existed, and so the tribal courts have jurisdiction over the case. The case does get into some interesting questions of where, exactly, the line is on tribal sovereignty, but actually comes to a pretty straightforward conclusion, namely that the rules the Supreme Court had handed down previously mean pretty much what they say.
Here too, I'm talking about the lower court's ruling because the Supreme Court was equally divided. So again, no decision from the Supreme Court, and the Fifth Circuit's ruling stands.
Mathis v. United States
This case has to do with the intersection of federal and state criminal law. Under a federal law called the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA), a defendant faces a mandatory 15-year prison sentence if he or she is convicted of being a felon in possession of a firearm and he or she has had three prior convictions for "violent" felonies. The question here is whether a specific Iowa burglary statute qualifies as a "violent felony" for the purpose of the law. The Court goes through the different ways this question is answered. The complication comes from the fact that the Iowa statute only has one set of elements (the things the defendant has to have done in order to be guilty), but lists alternate factual bases for those elements to be met. The Supreme Court had previously ruled that if the state crime was broader than a "generic" offense (i.e. that more types of acts could lead to violating it), it doesn't qualify as a violent felony for the purposes of the ACCA. Even if the defendant's actions would fit within the generic offense, if the state statute under which he or she was convicted is broader than the generic offense, it still doesn't count under the ACCA.
Here, the generic offense of burglary is unlawful entry into a building or other structure. The Iowa statute, meanwhile, requires unlawful entry into "any building, structure, [or] land, water, or air vehicle." The Court goes on to explain which method should be used to determine whether this falls under the ACCA, and finds that it's broader than the generic offense. Thus Mathis' conviction under the ACCA can't be based on a violation of the Iowa burlgary statute. The ruling was 5-3.
Opinion (PDF).
Birchfield v. North Dakota
When a driver is pulled over on suspicion of drunk driving, they are commonly ordered to undergo a breath test to make sure their blood-alcohol content is below the legal limit. The law usually treats this as a case of "implied consent," meaning that by driving you consent to submitting to a breath test if there's probable cause to stop you (in turn meaning no Fourth Amendment violation). A breath test above the legal limit is generally probable cause to arrest you. But sometimes the state requires a blood test instead (or in addition to) a breath test. Increasingly, states are make it a crime in and of itself to refuse either a breath or blood test.
The Fourth Amendment is based in large parts on an expectation of privacy from government intrusion. But a search incident to arrest, as it's known, has long been held to be fine under the Fourth Amendement. So if you're arrested lawfully, the police can search you without needing to go get a warrant first. But even this has limits. In looking at the case at hand, the Court looked at breath and blood tests separately. In balancing the accused's privacy rights against the government's interest in conviction, the Court found that breath tests are fine without a warrant, blood tests are not. Basically, the Court said that breath tests are not as invasive as a blood test (which requires piercing the skin, among other things), and that there's no reason the police can't take the time to get a warrant in the latter case. It's far less practicable to wait to get a warrant when someone is on the side of the road.
The vote was 5-3. Justices Sotomayor and Ginsburg agreed as to the blood test, but concluded that the warrant requirement should apply to breath tests as well. Justice Thomas, on the other hand, said that both should be allowed without a warrant.
Fisher v. University of Tex. at Austin
This was the other biggie. This is a long-running case about the University of Texas' admissions policy, which considered the applicant's race as a small part of its admissions criteria for a small percentage of students. Under state law, anyone who graduates in the top 10% of their high school class gets automatic admission to any public Texas university, and UT Austin got some 75% of its students that way. Fisher, the petitioner, was not in the top 10% of her high school class, and so was considered for admission under the other criteria, and rejected. She argued that because she's white, she was at a disadvantage in the admissions process in violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
This case had previously been heard back in 2013, but the Supreme Court sent it back to the lower courts, because it found they used the wrong legal standard in deciding it. In prior cases, the Court had ruled that a school's interest in a diverse student body (including racial diversity) is valid, but that schools may not use a "quota" system, i.e. require that a specific percentage of their student body be from a given race. Looking at the facts of this case, the Court decided that UT had shown that its approach, which involved race as a factor that goes, along with other data, into one part of a student's score for the purposes of admission, was specific enough to satisfy the relevant constitutional requirements. The Court noted that a certain amount of deference should be given to a school (within reason) to determine what best serves its interests.
It's a tough case to summarize, to be honest. Affirmative action is a hugely controversial issue, both from a policy standpoint as well as a legal one. I don't think the majority did a good job of articulating its reasoning, and the dissent raises some good points in my opinion that weren't adequately addressed. Justice Kennedy wrote the majority opinion, and he has a habit of speaking in grander concepts rather than specifics (he wrote the majority opinion in the same-sex marriage case as well, and went to town like he was auditioning to be the next Jefferson).
The case was decided 4-3. Interestingly, both racial minorities on the Court (Justices Alito and Thomas) dissented, along with the Chief Justice. Justice Kagan wasn't involved, as she'd worked on the case when she was Solicitor General prior to her appointment to the Court.
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That's it for this decision day. As I said, there was quite a bit! I don't know as I'll go back much further in the term (although I'll probably look to see if there's anything else of interest).
Side note: my kingdom for subheadings.
Until next time!