When discussing how strictly elections constrain legislators, whose default seems to be shirking public preference, Bryan Caplan argues that the degree of shirking is inversely proportional to the importance of the issue to the public:
Politicians’ wiggle room creates opportunities for special interest groups—private and public, lobbyists and bureaucrats—to get their way. On my account, though, interest groups are unlikely to directly “subvert” the democratic process. Politicians rarely stick their necks out for unpopular policies because an interest group begs them—or pays them—to do so. Their careers are on the line; it is not worth the risk. Instead, interest groups push along the margins of public indifference. If the public has no strong feelings about how to reduce dependence on foreign oil, ethanol producers might finagle a tax credit for themselves. No matter how hard they lobbied, though, they would fail to ban gasoline.
I'm not sure if that dovetails with your observed equilibrium of democracy, but I was reminded of it.
As for my apathy: I'm apathetic online. It's in person where I have more conviction. I don't think there's a person who knows me well that doesn't also know the extent of my contempt and low regard for this administration and the enabling Republican congressional delegation.